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LABOR LAW
Of Time L imits Worksharing And Deferral
By BarbaraJ. Fick
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
V.
Commercial Office Products Company
(Docket No. 86.1696)
Argued January 13, 1988
Viewed from one perspective, this case involves a relative-
ly narrow issue of statutory interpretation: What does the
phrase "unless such proceedings have been earlier terminat-
ed" mean? As such, it presents an archetypal example of legal
quibbling over semantics.
On the other hand, the outcome of this case will affect
thousands of charges of employment discrimination current-
ly pending both before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and in courts.
ISSUE
When a state civil rights agency decides to defer process-
ing an employment discrimination charge to the EEOC, has
the agency "terminated" its proceedings so that the charge
will be deemed filed with the EEOC for purposes of calcu-
lating the statute of limitations?
FACTS
Two hundred and eighty-nine days after she was fired
from her job, Suanne Leerssen filed a charge of sex discrimi-
nation with the EEOC against her employer, Commercial
Office Products. A few days after receiving the charge, the
EEOC transmitted a copy to the Colorado Civil Rights
Division (CCRD), a state agency charged with enforcing
state law prohibiting employment discrimination based on
sex. Several days later, the CCRD informed the EEOC that it
was declining to process the charge pursuant to the work-
sharing agreement between itself and the EEOC and advised
Leerssen that it was taking no action on her charge until the
EEOC terminated its proceedings. Subsequently, the CCRD
informed Leerssen that it had never had jurisdiction over her
because her charge had not been filed within the 180-day
limitation period required by state law.
As part of the EEOC's investigation of Leerssen's charge, it
issued a subpoena to Commercial Office Products request-
ing it to provide certain documents. Commercial Office
Products refused to comply with the request on the grounds
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that the charge which Leerssen filed with the EEOC was
untimely and therefore the EEOC did not have jurisdiction
over the case.
The EEOC filed suit in federal district court asking the
court to force Commercial Office Products to comply with
the subpoena. The district court, however, denied the
EEOC's request, agreeing with Commercial that Leerssen's
EEOC charge was untimely. Upon appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision (803 F. 2d 581 (1986)).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
prohibiting employment discrimination, many states already
had laws on the books prohibiting the same conduct. Con-
gress clearly stated its intention not to displace or supersede
such regulation, allowing state discrimination laws to coexist
with Title VII. Congress then dealt with the problem of
coordinating the enforcement efforts of state and federal
agencies concerning the same legal issues. This coordina-
tion was accomplished in a series of procedural rules includ-
ed in Title VII detailing where and when a charge of
employment discrimination must be filed.
An individual alleging employment discrimination under
Title VII must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days
after the discrimination took place. However, when employ-
ment discrimination occurs in a state which has a law
prohibiting such conduct, an individual who initiates pro-
ceedings under state law is given 300 days to file a complaint
with the EEOC. Title VII also provides that where there is
such concurrent jurisdiction, the individual must first file a
charge with the state agency and cannot file a charge with
the EEOC "before the expiration of sixty days after proceed-
ings have been commenced under the state...law, unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated" (section
706(c) of Title VII).
This provision, requiring initial deferral to a state agency,
was included to allow the states to deal with discrimination
problems on a local level, where possible, to avoid unneces-
sary federal intervention, and to provide for expeditious and
nonduplicative processing of charges.
Congress also authorized the EEOC to cooperate with
state agencies by entering into written agreements to pro.
mote effective enforcement of Title VII. Accordingly, the
EEOC has entered into worksharing agreements with forty-
three states. These agreements provide for a division of labor
in processing discrimination charges where there is concur-
rent state and federal jurisdiction; the state agencies initially
process certain types of claims and the EEOC initially pro-
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cesses others. Most of these agreements also provide that
where the state agency waives Its right to initially process a
charge, it retains jurisdiction over the charge and reserves the
right to act after the EEOC terminates its proceedings.
The EEOC interprets the deferral and time limitations
provisions of Title VII in light of these worksharing agree-
ments. Thus, when a worksharing agreement provides that a
certain charge over which there is concurrent jurisdiction is
to be initially processed by the EEOC, the EEOC views the
state as having "terminated" its proceedings for purposes of
section 706(c). Therefore, the charge is deemed filed with
the EEOC as of that date In determining whether the charge
is timely under the 300-day limitation.
According to the EEOC's view of Leerssen's case, both the
CCRD and the EEOC had jurisdiction over the substance of
her charge. Pursuant to their worksharing agreement, the
CCRD waived Its right to initially process and charge. Thus,
the CCRD had "terminated" its proceedings and the charge
was "filed" with the EEOC within the 300-day time limit.
Both the district court and court of appeals disagreed with
the EEOC's interpretation of section 706(c) and its applica-
tion to the Leerssen case. The appeals court held that where
a state has jurisdiction over a charge, that charge cannot be
filed with the EEOC until either sixty days have elapsed
since the charge was filed with the state, or the state has
terminated Its proceedings. In Leerssen's case, since the
charge was not initially filed until day 289, the sixty-day
period did not conclude until the 349th day-past the 300-
day time limit for filing with the EEOC. Thus, her charge
could only have been considered timely if the state "termi-
nated" its proceedings prior to the 300th day. Under the
worksharing agreement, the state merely waived initial pro-
cessing of the charge; it did not terminate its authority over
the charge. Indeed, it expressly retained jurisdiction to act
after the EEOC had terminated its proceedings. This does
not amount to a termination of state proceedings for pur-
poses of section 706(c). Since the state did not terminate its
proceedings, nor had sixty days elapsed (within the 300-day
time limit), Leerssen's charge with the EEOC was untimely.
Most of the individuals who file employment discrimina-
tion charges with the EEOC are lay people unassisted by
attorneys. As acknowledged by the appeals court, there is
much confusion among complainants over the time limits
for filing charges. This confusion undermines two important
goals of Title VII: to facilitate filing discrimination charges by
lay complainants and to resolve such discrimination claims
quickly. The Supreme court's decision in this case will not
only determine the fate of thousands of pending charges
which will be untimely and subject to dismissal if the Court
affirms the appeals court interpretation, but it may also clarify
the filing procedures for future claimants, making the pro-
cess more accessible.
ARGUMENTS
For the Equal Employment OpportmAty Commission
(Counsel, Richardj Lazarus, Department offJustice, Wash-
lngton, DC 20503; telephone (202) 633.2217)
1. Looking solely at the relevant statutory language does not
resolve the issue in this case. The language providing that
no charge may be filed with the EEOC "before the
expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under state...law, unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated" is unclear.
2. Since the meaning of the statute is not discernible from its
face, it is appropriate to consider the legislative history
behind this section of the statute to determine its intent.
The purpose behind the deferral provision was to give
state agencies the opportunity to redress the problem of
discrimination by applying and enforcing their own
laws-avoiding unnecessary federal intervention. When
the state declines to process the charge and instead refers
it to the EEOC, the purpose behind the deferral provision
is satisfied. The state was given the opportunity to apply
and enforce its law and chose to waive that opportunity.
3. Affirming the court of appeals' interpretation of the defer-
ral provision undermines the statute's purpose. This inter-
pretation requires either that the EEOC wait sixty days or
that the state completely relinquish jurisdiction. The
sixty-day delay would thwart Congress' clear intent to
encourage processing all discrimination charges prompt-
ly. To require the states to completely surrender their
jurisdiction over the case is contrary to congressional
intent to defer to the wishes of state agencies.
4. Other sections of Title VII support the EEOC's interpreta-
tion of the deferral provision. Title VII specifically autho-
rizes execution of written agreements between state
agencies and the EEOC detailing cooperative arrange-
ments. Worksharing agreements, such as the one in-
volved in this case, increase cooperation by a division of
labor involving initial processing of charges, and help
avoid simultaneous federal and state proceedings.
For Commterial Office Producs Company (Counsel of
Record, James L. Stone, One United Bank Center, 1700
Lincoln Street, Suite 2400, Denver, CO 8203; telephone
(303) 830-2400)
1. The words of section 706 are not ambiguous and should
be given their plain meaning. The plain meaning of
"terminated" Is completed or ended. The CCRD did not
terminate its proceedings; it expressly retained the right
to act on the charge in the future.
2. Section 706(c) does not confer any rights on state agen-
cies which they may waive; rather, it Is a statutory prohibi-
tion aimed at the EEOC. The statute prohibits the EEOC
from allowing a charge to be filed before either the
expiration of the sixty-day deferral period or termination
of state proceedings, whichever Is earlier. A state agency
does not have the power to authorize the EEOC to take
action prohibited by the statute.
3. Even if a state agency could waive its rights and allow the
EEOC to proceed, the CCRD lacks the authority under
state law to waive initial processing of the charge. State
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law requires the agency to take action on a charge
immediately. The CCRD's agreement with the EEOC not
to take action contravenes this law.
4. The worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the
CCRD evades the congressional intent behind the defer.
ral provisions of Title VII. These provisions seek not only
to foster federal and state cooperation and provide for
federal enforcement when the state's efforts are ineffec-
tive, but most importantly to prevent federal dominance
in the field.
5. By giving effect to the worksharing agreement, a com-
plainant may choose between a state or federal remedy
and undermine the purpose behind the deferral require-
ment merely by choosing where to initially file a charge.
Under the EEOC's agreement with the CCRD, the agency
where the charge is filed is the agency which initially
processes the case.
6. Leerssen's charge was untimely under state law; therefore,
her Title VII charge must be filed within the 180-day
filing period. She does not get the benefit of the extended
filing period since the state agency lacked the authority to
grant relief.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of the EEOC
The state of Colorado joined by Connecticut, the District
of Columbia, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Wis-
consin and Wyoming filed a brief arguing that to interpret
"termination" as requiring the states to completely surrender
jurisdiction frustrates state interests and state antidiscrimina-
tion laws. The backlog of cases pending before state agen-
cies makes it improbable that a charge will be investigated
within sixty days. They contend the worksharing arrange-
ment serves state Interests by providing for efficient and
prompt processing of charges without either a sixty-day delay
or duplication of effort, while at the same time allowing
states to retain jurisdiction to review EEOC findings and
provide a remedywhen the EEOC is unable to do so.
In Support of CommerciW Offlce Products Company
The Equal Employment Advisory Council filed a brief
arguing that Leerssen's charge does not qualify for the 300-
day time limit because the CCRD did not have the authority
to grant relief. It lacked this authority both because the
charge was untimely filed under state law and thus the CCRD
had no jurisdiction to act and because it had contractually
relinquished its authority to grant relief to the EEOC in the
worksharing agreement.
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